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Information moves security prices. How information disseminates through 
agents in financial markets and into security prices, though, is not as well 
understood. We study a particular type of this dissemination in the form of social 
networks. Social networks are network structures composed of nodes (usually 
people or institutions) that are connected through various social relationships 
ranging from casual to close bonds. In the context of information flow, social 
networks allow a piece of information to flow, often in predictable paths, along the 
network. Thus, one can test the importance of the social network in disseminating 
information by testing its predictions on the flow of information. One convenient 
aspect of social networks is that they have often been formed ex-ante, sometimes 
years in the past, and their formation is then frequently independent of the 
information to be transferred. This is the case with the social network we examine. 
Specifically, we define social networks as those tied to educational institutions. The 
nodes of our social networks are mutual fund portfolio managers and senior officers 
of publicly traded companies. We then examine the information flow between these 
nodes, and test predictions on the portfolio allocations and returns earned by 
mutual fund managers on securities within and outside their networks. 
We believe the two agents of our social network (senior officers and portfolio 
managers) provide a useful setting because one side likely possesses private 
information, while the other side has a large incentive to access this private 
information. Similarly, the stock market is a valuable setting in which to examine 
private information flow through a social network because of the information’s 
eventual revelation into prices, and so easy relation to stock return predictability. 
We examine how private information flows from top senior firm officers (and board 
members) to fund portfolio managers connected through a network.  
Our tests focus on educational institutions providing a basis for social 
networks.  Specifically, our goal is to use social networks to study information 
dissemination in security markets. We use academic institutions attended for both 
undergraduate and graduate degrees as our network measure and test the 
hypothesis that mutual fund managers are more likely to place larger bets in firms 
run by individuals in their network, and earn higher average returns on these The Small World of Investing — Page 2 
 
investments. We motivate the use of educational institutions as a basis for social 
networks in three ways. First, people often select into undergraduate and graduate 
programs made up of social groups having aligned interests to their own, 
generating both a higher level of interaction and a longer relationship length from 
relationships built.
1 Second, outside of donations to religious organizations, 
educational institutions are the largest beneficiary of individuals’ charitable 
donations. Over 1 in 7 dollars donated in 2005 went to educational institutions, 
suggesting the presence of ties to academic institutions past graduation.
2 Lastly, 
there is direct evidence that school relationships are on average more homophilous 
than those formed in other settings (Flap and Kalmijn (2001)) and that 
communication between parties is more effective when the two parties are more 
alike (Bhowmik and Rogers (1971)). 
There are a number of potential ways information could be moving through 
networks. First, there could be a direct transfer from senior firm officers to 
portfolio managers. Second, the networks could simply lower the cost of gathering 
information for portfolio managers. So, for instance, it may take fewer calls, or 
people may be more forthcoming with information if they are inside the network. 
This explanation would be a case where agents have comparative advantages in 
collecting certain types of information. Third, it could be that networks may make 
it cheaper to access information on managers, and so assess managerial quality (for 
similar reasons as above). We are not able to completely rule out any of these 
mechanisms, but we do provide evidence of all three working to some extent in the 
data.  
To test whether information is disseminated through education networks, 
we use trading decisions of mutual fund portfolio managers in firms that have 
senior officials in their social network (connected firms) and firms that do not 
(non-connected firms). Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) offer a simple intuition that 
when agents have comparative advantages in collecting certain types of 
                                                 
1 See Richardson (1940), Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), McPherson et. al (2001), Fischer et al. 
(1977). 
2  Data from The Giving Institute. In 2005, 15% of charitable donations ($38.6 billion) were given 
to educational institutions. The largest recipient, religious organizations, received 36% ($93.2 
billion) (Giving USA (2006)).  The Small World of Investing — Page 3 
 
information, we should observe them earning abnormal returns to this information. 
We attempt to identify exactly these situations where portfolio managers are 
expected to have a comparative advantage from their respective social networks. 
We then examine both their portfolio allocation decisions, and ability to predict 
returns, in both the connected and non-connected classes of stocks. 
To better understand our approach, consider the following example.
3 In 
March 1996, Mr. Smith was the sole portfolio manager of the Phantom Aggressive 
Fund, a large cap/blend mutual fund with around $2.8 billion under management. 
Mr. Smith holds an MBA from Harvard Business School (hereafter HBS), class of 
1983. According to the March 1996 SEC filing, between September 30
th 1995 and 
March 29
th 1996, Mr. Smith purchased 233,000 shares of Cummins Engine Co. Inc, 
a large engine maker that he did not previously own. At the quarter’s end on 
March 29
th 1996, Cummins’ shares closed at $40.365 bringing the fund total 
position to $9.41 million.  
Cummins is an example of a “Harvard Stock”: In 1996, 62% of the board of 
directors held a degree from Harvard University and 46% of the board held an 
MBA from HBS. Over the year after Mr. Smith established a position, a series of 
good events befell Cummins, pushing up its stock price. In May 1996, Cummins 
announced a joint venture with the Fiat group to manufacture a new series of 
diesel engines. Between March 1996 and June 1996 the Phantom Aggressive Fund 
purchased an additional 105,500 shares. Then, in July 1996 the company 
announced a joint venture with Dongfeng Motor Corp, China’s largest truck 
producer. 1996 turned out to be a record year for Cummins in terms of sales. 
Cummins’ good fortunes continued into 1997, as in January 1997 Cummins 
announced that its main machinery was selected for a new class of search and 
rescue craft designed and manufactured in Italy.  
Mr. Smith then unloaded the entire fund’s position in Cummins (338,700 
shares valued at $23.9 million) in June 1997. Between March 1996 and June 1997 
Cummins’ stock price rose by 72%, beating the S&P500 Index by 36%. Moreover, 
                                                 
3 This is an actual example from our sample, although we have altered the name of both the 
portfolio manager and the mutual fund.  The Small World of Investing — Page 4 
 
the Phantom Aggressive Fund, in addition to earning a large return, unloaded the 
shares at a market peak: After the liquidation of the entire position by the fund, 
Cummins’ stock performance was poor. Over the subsequent year, Cummins’ stock 
price dropped by 18%, underperforming the S&P500 Index by 52%. A graphical 
depiction of the timeline of events is shown in the accompanying Figure 1. 
Cummins, however, is not the only Harvard stock in the Phantom 
Aggressive Fund’s portfolio. More generally, between 1993 and 2003 Mr. Smith 
managed a variety of different funds. Looking at his holdings over time reveals a 
tendency to place larger bets in companies run by his HBS classmates. Between 
1993 and 2003, Mr. Smith’s average portfolio weight is only 0.55%, while the 
average weight on stocks where the company’s CEO, CFO, or Chairman holds a 
Harvard MBA and overlapped with the money manager on the Harvard campus is 
2.56%, nearly five times larger. 
Not only did Mr. Smith make larger bets on his Harvard-run holdings, but 
he also received higher average returns on them. Specifically, between 1993 and 
2003 Mr. Smith’s “connected” investments in companies where a senior officer was 
also an HBS alumni and overlapped with him, outperformed the “non-connected” 
portion of his portfolio by 15.1% a year. His “connected” stock picks also 
outperformed the S&P500 Index (15% per year) and a passive value weighted 
index of Harvard stocks (12.7% per year).  
In this paper we show that the above example represents in fact a much 
more systematic pattern, in both holdings and returns, across the entire universe of 
US mutual fund portfolio managers: fund managers place larger concentrated bets 
on companies to which they are connected through an education network, and 
perform significantly better on these connected positions than on non-connected 
positions. 
We create calendar time portfolios that mimic the aggregate portfolio 
allocation of the mutual fund sector in connected and non-connected securities and 
show that portfolio managers earn higher returns on their connected holdings. A 
strategy of buying a mimicking portfolio of connected holdings and selling short a 
mimicking portfolio of non-connected holdings yields returns up to 8.36% per year. The Small World of Investing — Page 5 
 
Furthermore, the portfolio of connected stocks held by portfolio managers 
outperforms the portfolio of connected stocks that managers choose not to hold by 
6.32% per year. Both the portfolio allocation and return predictability results are 
increasing with the strength of the connection. 
  We test a number of alternative hypotheses. We include firm characteristics, 
fund characteristics, and industry, none of which can explain managers’ large bets 
on connected stocks or the abnormal returns managers earn on these connected 
positions. Another alternative hypothesis is that our findings are driven by the 
geographical effects documented in Coval and Moskowitz (2001). So, perhaps 
Michigan students tend to locate around Detroit, while Stanford students tend to 
locate around Silicon Valley.  To test this, we examine fund holdings in local and 
distant firms and find no differences in our results, suggesting that geographic 
effects are unlikely to explain our findings.  We also show that are results are not 
driven by a few top schools (ex. Ivy League), or by small fund managers, or by a 
certain part of our sample period. 
We also examine the returns of connected and non-connected stocks around 
news events. If the high return of connected securities is due to information flow 
through the network, we would expect to see the bulk of the return premium when 
the news is eventually released to the investing public. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, we find that nearly the entire difference in return between stocks 
within and outside a manager’s network is concentrated around corporate news 
announcements. 
We then look at changes in a fund’s portfolio manager, and focus on the 
specific case where the previous manager and the new manager share no 
educational connection. We find that incoming managers unload securities within 
the old manager’s network, and at the same time purchase securities within their 
own network. Finally, we show that managers who share a common education 
network tend to herd with each other in their trading decisions, and do so 
significantly more on connected stocks within their portfolios. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief 
background and literature review. Section II describes the data, while Section III The Small World of Investing — Page 6 
 
explores which schools are most connected to firms and mutual funds. Section IV 
details the portfolio allocation results.  Section V establishes the main education 
network return results. Section VI provides robustness checks and considers 
alternative explanations. Section VII examines portfolio weights around mutual 
fund manager changes, while Section VIII explores fund manager behavior. Section 
IX concludes. 
  
I.  Background and literature review 
Our work links a large literature on the portfolio choices and investment 
performance of mutual fund managers with a growing literature on the role of 
social networks in economics. 
  The strand of the mutual fund literature most closely related to our paper is 
the body of work exploring whether mutual fund managers possess stock-picking 
ability. The evidence on this question is decidedly mixed. Several papers (Jensen 
(1968), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), and Carhart (1997)) find that active 
managers fail to outperform passive benchmark portfolios (even before expenses), 
while others (Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1995), Daniel et al. (1997), and Wermers (1997)) find that active managers do 
exhibit some stock-picking skills.
4 The evidence is similarly mixed as to whether it 
is possible to identify particular types of mutual funds (or managers) that perform 
consistently better than others.
5 Carhart (1997), for example, concludes that most 
of the persistent performance (net of fees) in the fund industry is a result of 
managers buying stocks which tend to be high-performing momentum stocks 
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)), with much of the remaining persistence 
attributable to the worst-performing funds. 
Among the very few papers that have been able to successfully link mutual 
                                                 
4 Note that Berk and Green (2004) argue that failing to beat a benchmark does not imply a 
manager lacks skill. 
5 See Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbottson (1994), Brown and 
Goetzmann (1994), Gruber (1996), and Elton et al. (1993) for evidence of persistence at various 
horizons up to 5 years, and Malkiel (1995) and Carhart (1997) for countervailing evidence. See also 
Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005).  The Small World of Investing — Page 7 
 
fund outperformance to measurable characteristics, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
investigate biographical data on managers and find that fund managers from 
undergraduate institutions with higher average SAT scores earn higher returns. 
Other evidence from manager-level data indicates that fund managers tend to 
overweight nearby companies (Coval and Moskowitz (1999), and earn higher 
returns on their local holdings (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), suggesting a link 
between geographic proximity and information transmission.
6 We add to this list 
by exploring connections between board members and mutual fund managers, and 
in doing so identify another channel through which fund managers achieve superior 
returns. 
Directly exploring the role of social networks, connections, and influence in 
financial markets is a relatively new development in the finance literature.
7 Closest 
to our work are the findings in Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), who document 
word-of-mouth effects between same-city mutual fund managers with respect to 
their portfolio choices, and Kuhnen (2005), who documents a link between past 
business connections between mutual fund directors and advisory firms and future 
preferential contracting decisions.
8 Also related are the findings in Massa and 
Simonov (2005), documenting a relation between the portfolio choices of individual 
investors and their past educational backgrounds.
9 
Our empirical strategy is motivated by a network sociology literature (see, 
for example, Mizruchi (1982, 1992), Useem (1984)) that employs corporate board 
linkages as a measure of personal networks. Board linkages are typically isolated by 
looking at direct board interlocks between firms (as in Hallock (1997), "back-door" 
links among directors across firms (as in Larcker et al. (2005) and Conyon and 
                                                 
6 Chen et al (2005) and Christofferson and Sarkissian (2002) also explore how location affects 
mutual funds' behavior. 
7 See Jackson (2005) for a survey on the economics of social networks. 
8 See also Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) for evidence that measures of sociability are linked to 
increased stock market participation, Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2005) for evidence of a positive 
impact of venture capital networks on investment performance, and Perez-Gonzalez (2006) for 
evidence of a negative impact of nepotism on firm performance in the context of CEO succession. 
9 See also Parkin (2006), who identifies school clustering of lawyers at law firms that cannot be 
explained by quality or location, and a link between promotion chances in law firms and the 
concentration of partners with similar educational backgrounds. The Small World of Investing — Page 8 
 
Muldoon (2006)), or direct and indirect links between board members and 
government agencies or officials (as in Faccio (2006) and Fisman et al. (2006), 
among others), and have shown to be important mechanisms for the sharing of 
information and the adoption of common practices across firms.
10 Our approach is 
different in that we focus on direct connections between board members and 
mutual fund managers via shared educational backgrounds.  
 
II.  Data 
The data in this study is collected from several sources. Our data on mutual 
fund holdings come from the CDA/Spectrum Mutual Funds database, which 
includes all registered mutual funds filing with the SEC. The data show holdings of 
individual funds collected via fund prospectuses and SEC N30D filings at either 
quarterly or semi-annual frequency. We focus the analysis on actively managed US 
equity funds by including funds with the investment objectives of aggressive 
growth, growth, or growth and income in the CDA dataset. Additionally, we 
manually screen all funds and exclude index funds, foreign-based funds, US-based 
international funds, fixed income funds, real estate funds, precious metal funds, 
balanced funds, closed-end funds, and variable annuities. 
We obtain portfolio managers’ biographical information from Morningstar, 
Inc. For each mutual fund, Morningstar provides the name(s) of the portfolio 
manager(s), a brief vitae including the manager’s starting date as well as previous 
funds managed, all the undergraduate and graduate degrees received, the year in 
which the degrees were granted, and the institution granting the degree. 
Morningstar started collecting the manager’s educational background in 1990. 
More details on the data collection process are given in the appendix. We match 
Morningstar’s biographical data to the CDA fund holdings using the MFLINKS 
data link provided by Wharton Research Data Services. Our final mutual fund 
                                                 
10 Examples of the latter include the adoption of poison pills (Davis (1991)), corporate acquisition 
activity (Haunschild (1993)), CEO compensation (Khurana (2002)), and the decision to make 
political contributions (Mizruchi (1992)). 
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sample includes survivorship-bias free data on holdings and biographical 
information for 1,648 US actively managed equity funds and 2,501 portfolio 
managers between January 1990 and December 2006. This is the base sample of 
our tests.  
Stock return and accounting data is from CRSP/COMPUSTAT. We focus 
the analysis on common stocks only.
11 We also collect headlines news from Dow 
Jones newswires for all CRSP firms between 1990 and 2006. Details of our news 
database are given in the appendix. 
Board of directors and senior company officers’ biographical information was 
provided by BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited, a private research 
company specialized in social network data on company officials of US and 
European public and private companies. The data contain relational links among 
board of directors and other officials for active companies. Additionally, Boardex 
provided us with historical files on inactive companies. Links in the dataset are 
constructed by cross referencing employment history, educational background and 
professional qualifications. A typical entry would be as follows: in the year 2001, 
Mr. Smith, CEO of Unicorn Inc., was “connected” to Mr. White, President of ABC 
Inc. since between 1992 and 1997 they both served on the board of directors of 
XYZ Inc, respectively as CFO and COO. The data contain current and past role of 
every company official with start date (year) and end date (year), a board dummy 
indicating whether the individual serves (served) on the board of directors in the 
current (past) employment position, all the undergraduate and graduate degrees 
received, the year in which the degrees were granted, and the institution granting 
the degree. Firms are identified by CUSIP number.  
For each firm in the sample, we use the historical link files for all 
individuals to reconstruct the annual time series of identities and educational 
background of board members and senior officers (defined as CEO, CFO or 
Chairman). The first entry in our sample is in the year 1939, the last is in 2006. 
Given the focus of our analysis, we restrict the sample to US publicly traded firms. 
 The social networks we examine in the paper are defined over educational 
                                                 
11 CRSP share codes 10 and 11. The Small World of Investing — Page 10 
 
institutions, and thus we have to link each member of the social network by these 
institutions. Thus, we match institutions and degrees on Morningstar and Boardex. 
We group the degrees into 6 categories: (i) business school (MBA), (ii) medical 
school, (iii) general graduate (MA or MS), (iv) PhD, (v) law school, and (vi) 
general undergraduate. More details are given in the appendix.  
Finally, we match company officials’ biographical information to stock 
return data from CRSP. The final sample includes educational background on 
42,269 board members and 14,122 senior officials for 7,660 CRSP stocks between 
January 1990 and December 2006.  
Table I gives summary statistics for the matched samples of firms-boards-
funds from January 1990 — December 2006. From Panel A, we average around 700 
funds per year, which comprise 84% of the mutual fund universe. Our sample of 
firms averages roughly 4,500 per year, which comprise 96% of total market value. 
The number of academic institutions in our sample averages 354 per year. In Panel 
B we report statistics by firm-year or fund-year. The academic institutions in our 
sample average 22 senior officers and 6 portfolio managers per institution. 
 
III.  Most connected institutions 
Our data allow us to quantify how “connected” universities are to both 
publicly traded firms and mutual funds. In Table I, Panel A we list the most 
connected academic institutions to both firms and mutual funds. Here, a 
connection to an academic institution is defined as: (i) for firms, any of the senior 
officers (CEO, CFO, and Chairman) having attended the institution and received a 
degree, and (ii) for funds, any of the portfolio managers having attended the 
institution for a degree. Thus, a given firm (fund) can be connected to multiple 
academic institutions. From Panel A, the most connected university to both 
publicly traded firms and mutual funds, is Harvard University. Harvard is 
connected to 12% of US publicly traded firms. These connections are not merely to 
mid-level managers, but to senior officers in the firm. Similarly, Harvard is 
connected to 16% of active equity mutual funds. University of Pennsylvania, 
University of Chicago, and Columbia University also consistently appear in the top The Small World of Investing — Page 11 
 
5 most connected schools to both publicly traded firms and mutual funds. It is 
worth noting that excluding the top connected academic institutions does not 
affect any of the results in the paper
12.   
The breakdown of the degrees is in Panel B of Table I. Comparing graduate 
degrees between senior officers and portfolio managers, portfolio managers are more 
likely to have any post-undergraduate degree, with a higher frequency of MBA 
degrees. The right side of Panel B in Table I shows the graduation dates of senior 
officers and of portfolio managers. There is a large overlap in graduation dates 
between the two groups, occurring in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The distribution of 
graduation years suggests that portfolio managers may be on average younger than 
senior top officers at firms, as the portfolio managers received their degrees later. 
The significant overlap in years, however, allows us to exploit variation in the 
networks of those attending the same institution during the same (as opposed to 
different) years.       
 
IV.  Results: Holdings of connected securities 
In this section we examine mutual fund managers’ portfolio choices.  We 
compare allocations in stocks to which they are connected within their education 
network, relative to stocks to which they are not. To begin, we need a metric to 
define “connected” holdings. We define four types of connections between the 
portfolio manager and firm, based on whether the portfolio manager and a senior 
official of the firm (CEO, CFO, or Chairman): attended the same school 
(CONNECTED1), attended the same school and received the same degree 
(CONNECTED2), attended the same school at the same time (CONNECTED3), 
and attended the same school at the same time, and received the same degree 
(CONNECTED4).
13 We attempt to define these in increasing degree of strength of 
the link. We view CONNECTED1 and CONNECTED2 as the weakest 
connections. For example, individuals that attended the same institutions and/or 
                                                 
12 See the discussion in Section VI and Table IX. 
13 We have also used boards of directors to measure connectedness. We define a board as being 
connected if at least 50% of its members have an education connection to the portfolio manager. 
We report these results in the appendix. 
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earned the same degree may interact as part of the alumni network. We view 
CONNECTED3 and CONNECTED4 as the strongest links, providing the highest 
likelihood of direct social interaction with the connected individual while attending 
school. 
Equity portfolio managers may exhibit preferences for certain securities based 
on a number of characteristics. Managers may tend to overweight all securities in 
their network, perhaps due to a form of familiarity bias (see Huberman (2001)), or 
managers may place large concentrated bets in certain connected securities due to 
comparative advantages in collecting information through their network. Our focus 
is on the role of the social network in the transfer of information to security prices, 
via the trading of actively managed funds. Thus, we look at stocks that managers 
actively choose to hold and compare the portfolio weights of those inside and 
outside of the managers’ networks. We discuss unconditional overweighting (or the 
lack of it) in section VIII. 
Table III shows OLS pooled regressions of portfolio weights on connected 
dummies and a series of controls. The dependent variable is the fund’s portfolio 
weight in a given stock, in basis points. The units of observation are stock-fund-
quarter. All regressions include quarter fixed effects. Controls include %STYLE, 
the percentage of the fund’s total net assets invested in the style corresponding to 
the stock in question (the stock’s style is calculated as in DGTW (1997)), ME, BM 
and R12 defined as percentiles of market value of equity, book to market, and past 
12 month return. Columns 1 to 4 of Panel A show the basic result: compared to 
the average weight in a given stock, mutual funds place larger bets on connected 
securities. Looking at column 1, compared to the average weight of 89.4 basis 
points, mutual funds invest an additional 28.45 basis points in securities where the 
firm’s senior officials attended the same institution. Moreover, the additional 
allocation to connected securities is increasing with the strength of the connection: 
fund managers place an additional 41bp in firms where the senior officer and the 
portfolio manager overlapped on the school campus (and received the same 
degree), roughly 44% higher relative to non-connected stocks. In addition, in other 
specifications we use industry, firm, fund, and fund investment objective code fixed The Small World of Investing — Page 13 
 
effects.
14 Although these do explain part of the variation in managers’ portfolio 
choices, all the specifications tell a consistent story: portfolio managers place larger 
bets in connected securities. 
Panel B presents similar tests, although we define the connections slightly 
differently. In Panel A, CONNECTED1, for instance, measures the cases where the 
portfolio manager attended the same school as a senior officer of the firm. This will 
include cases where the senior officer did and did not earn the same degree as the 
manager, and cases where they did and did not overlap in their time at the school. 
To isolate the effects of each of these components, we create three non-nested 
versions of the connection variables. So, in Panel B: CONNECTED1 measures 
cases where the portfolio manager and senior officer attended the same school, but 
did not earn the same degree and did not overlap in years; CONNECTED2 
measures those cases where the portfolio manager and senior officer attended the 
same school and earned the same degree, but did not overlap in years; 
CONNECTED3 measures those cases where the portfolio manager and senior 
officer overlapped at the school, but did not earn the same degree. From Panel B, 
all three of these connection proxies result in significantly larger bets on connected 
stocks. Column 1 shows that simply attending the same school, even with no 
degree or overlap, is associated with portfolio managers significantly placing larger 
bets in the connected stocks held. Panel B makes it clear that overlapping of years 
at the same institution seems to create the strongest tie to an education network: 
an additional weight of 43 bp, or 47%, more than in stocks where the portfolio 
manager did not overlap with a senior manager at the same university. Including 
controls and other fixed effects (as in Panel A) leads to similar conclusions.
15 
 
                                                 
14 The additional weight is more difficult to interpret with control as now the constant is measured 
relative to these. In Columns 5-10 we include CONNECTED1 and CONNECTED4 together in each 
regression. The reason we do not include all connections is that most of our degrees are either an 
undergraduate or an MBA. This causes CONNECTED1 and 2 to be highly correlated (0.71), as 
well as CONNECTED3 and 4 (0.70). Thus, we include only one from each pair.  
15 Here we are able to include all connection variables together. The Small World of Investing — Page 14 
 
V.  Results: Returns on connected holdings 
A. Portfolio Tests 
The mere fact that fund managers place large bets in connected stocks need 
not imply that these portfolio choices are beneficial. In this section we explore the 
performance of fund managers’ connected holdings compared to their non-
connected holdings, and test the hypothesis that managers earn higher returns on 
securities within their network.  
We use a standard calendar time portfolio approach. At the beginning of each 
calendar quarter, we assign stocks in each mutual fund portfolio (based on the 
most recent SEC filing) to one of two portfolios: connected or non-connected. We 
use same four types of connections defined in section IV. We compute monthly 
returns on connected and non-connected holdings between reports, based on the 
assumption that funds did not change their holdings between reports. Portfolios 
are rebalanced every calendar quarter and within a given fund portfolio, stocks are 
weighted by the fund’s dollar holdings (i.e., connected stocks are weighted by the 
fund’s dollar holdings in the connected portfolio, and non-connected stocks are 
weighted by the fund’s dollar holdings in the non-connected portfolio). Finally, we 
compute value weighted calendar time portfolios by averaging across funds, 
weighting individual fund portfolios by the fund’s total net asset value at the end 
of the previous quarter. This approach has the advantage of corresponding to a 
simple investment strategy of investing in connected and non-connected securities 
in proportion to the amount held by the universe of funds.  
Table IV illustrates our main result. This table includes all available stocks 
and all available funds, and focuses on the highest degree of connection 
(CONNECTED4). We report average annual portfolio returns minus Treasury bill 
returns (in percent) for the period 1990 to 2006. Table IV indicates that connected 
holdings earn excess returns of 16.05% annually on average, compared to 7.81% for 
all holdings, and 7.69% for non-connected holdings. A long-short portfolio that 
holds the connected portfolio and sells short the non-connected portfolio earns on 
average 8.36% per year (t-statistic of 3.78). These high average returns on 
connected stocks are not accompanied by increased levels of risk. Table IV reveals The Small World of Investing — Page 15 
 
a Sharpe ratio on connected holdings of 0.80 (compared to 0.42 for all holdings, 
and 0.41 for non-connected holdings); the Sharpe ratio on the long-short portfolio 
is even higher at 0.92. 
In Table V we analyze the risk-adjusted returns of our calendar time 
portfolios. We risk-adjust in two ways: first by calculating characteristically 
adjusted returns (“DGTW returns”) as in Daniel et al (1997), and second by 
computing five-factor alphas. For each stock, we compute DGTW returns by 
subtracting the return on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same 
size, market-book, and one year momentum quintile, from the stock’s raw return. 
The five-factor alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly portfolio excess 
returns on the monthly returns from the three Fama and French (1993) factor-
mimicking portfolios, Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor and Pastor and 
Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity factor. Table V reports average annual returns and 
alphas in percent, for all four degrees of connection (not just the strongest 
connection as in Table IV). 
Table V indicates that connected holdings outperform non-connected holdings 
in a statistically and economically significant way for all four degrees of 
connectedness, and for both methods of risk-adjustment.
16 Connected holdings earn 
between 14.76% and 20.08% annually in raw returns. The magnitude of the long-
short portfolio returns is large, and increases as the strength of the connection 
increases: the portfolio earns 3.03% for same school connections (CONNECTED1), 
3.71% for same school/degree connections (CONNECTED2), 6.85% for same 
school/year connections (CONNECTED3), and 8.36% for same school/degree/year 
connections (CONNECTED4). The corresponding DGTW returns on the long-
short portfolio range from 1.69% to 5.46% annually, while the 5-factor alphas range 
from 2.96% to 8.74% annually, all of which are statistically significant and 
economically large. Figure 2 shows annual returns of the calendar time portfolios.  
Table V also reports portfolio returns for the portfolio of connected holdings 
using the non-nested measures of holdings that do not overlap by year, degree (or 
                                                 
16 For brevity, we do not report results for the equally-weighted calendar time portfolios. These 
results, which are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those shown here, are available on 
request. The Small World of Investing — Page 16 
 
both), defined as in Table III. These help to identify the different components 
driving the return results, and ensure that the returns to each type of connection 
are not driven solely by high average returns on the CONNECTED4 portfolio (as 
all measures include all stocks identified by this definition). These non-nested 
results look similar to those reported using our standard connection measures. The 
long-short portfolio of connected minus non-connected generates abnormal returns 
between 1.5% and 5%.  Returns increase with the strength of the connection.   
However, since most managers and senior officers in our sample hold MBA degrees, 
requiring a year overlap but no common degree yields very undiversified portfolios; 
hence for CONNECTED3 we are unable to reject the null of no return 
predictability. 
In addition to examining replicating portfolios of the fund’s holdings, we 
also compute returns on the connected stocks that managers choose not to hold. 
We are interested in testing the hypothesis that managers have an informational 
advantage in securities within their network. Since mutual funds are often 
restricting from short selling, their active portfolio allocation may not reflect their 
full information advantage. Using the same portfolio construction approach as 
before, we compute value weighted returns on portfolios of connected securities 
that managers choose not to hold. For example the “connected not-held portfolio” 
would consist of a value weighted portfolio of all Stanford stocks that a Stanford 
manager chooses not to hold in a given quarter. As shown in Table VI, the 
portfolio of connected stocks held by portfolio managers outperforms the portfolio 
of connected stocks that managers’ choose not to hold by up to 6.32% per year 
(t=3.50) for the strongest connection, CONNECTED4.  
The results in Table III to Table VI lend support to the hypothesis that 
fund managers have comparative advantages in gathering information about 
connected firms. Funds earn higher returns on holdings where the portfolio 
managers and the firm’s senior management have a higher likelihood of social 
interaction. As a result, a long-short equity portfolio that replicates aggregate 
funds’ holdings in connected and non-connected securities earns large subsequent 
returns.  The Small World of Investing — Page 17 
 
 
B.  Purchases and Sells of Connected Stocks 
  In Table VII we investigate trading in connected and non-connected stocks. 
At the beginning of every calendar quarter stocks purchased within each mutual 
fund portfolio are assigned to one of two portfolios (connected and non-connected). 
In this table, “purchases” are defined as first-time purchases of a stock (“pickups”) 
plus all instances where a fund increases its portfolio weight in a given stock 
relative to its prior position; “sells” are defined as all instances where a fund 
decreases its portfolio weight in a given stock relative to its prior position, or sells 
off its entire remaining position in a stock. Table VII indicates that purchases of 
connected stocks outperform purchases of non-connected stocks by 2.69% annually 
(t-statistic = 2.27) for CONNECTED1, and a striking 9.04% annually (t-statistic 
= 3.65) for CONNECTED4. Similarly, the DGTW-adjusted long-short portfolio for 
same CONNECTED4 purchases earns 6.50% per year, while the corresponding 5-
factor alpha is 7.01% annually. Focusing solely on first-time purchases of a stock 
(“pickups”) we find similar results (albeit with less power in some cases): 
CONNECTED1 pickups outperform non-connected pickups by 4.41% (DGTW) to 
5.03% (5-factor alpha) per year.  
Panel B reports returns subsequent to net sales of connected and non-
connected stocks. If mutual funds correctly anticipated the arrival of negative 
signals we would expect to see low returns on funds’ net sales in connected stocks. 
Looking at returns on funds’ net sales reveals a fundamental asymmetry in their 
ability to earn high returns on connected firms: a portfolio that is long non-
connected sells and short connected sells actually earns negative abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, for most of the specifications in panel B we are unable to reject the 
hypothesis of no predictability after a fund unwinds a position in connected 
securities.  
These results suggest that although portfolio managers earn high returns on 
their connected holdings and purchases, the managers are not timing the sells of 
these positions well. This combined return pattern for purchases and sells is 
consistent with portfolio managers being more likely to receive (and act upon) The Small World of Investing — Page 18 
 
positive information through the social network. For example, senior firm officers 
may be more reluctant to disclose negative information about the firm’s prospects. 
Overall, these results indicate that portfolio managers outperform dramatically on 
their connected purchases (relative to their non-connected purchases), but actually 
underperform on their connected sells (relative to their non-connected sells), 
suggesting that fund managers lack timing ability on their connected sells.
17 
 
C.  Returns around News 
  In Table VIII we begin to explore the mechanism behind the high returns 
earned by portfolio managers on securities within their network. As noted earlier, 
one way that social networks may benefit fund managers is by facilitating the flow 
of private information. If the returns to connected stocks are driven by information 
flow through the network, we would expect to see managers making the bulk of the 
return premium when the news that was transferred through the network (and so 
caused the manager to purchase the stock) is eventually incorporated into prices. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we split the monthly returns for each individual 
stock into returns on earnings announcements (defined as returns in calendar 
months with scheduled quarterly earnings releases), returns on “other headlines” 
(defined as returns in calendar months with at least 1 news announcement on the 
Dow Jones Newswires, as described in the appendix, but no scheduled earnings 
announcements), and “no news returns” (defined as returns in calendar months 
with no news announcements on the Dow Jones newswires and no scheduled 
quarterly earnings releases). We then compute monthly news returns and no-news 
returns on connected and non-connected holdings.
18 
In panel B we report the average return of the long-short portfolio that holds 
the portfolio of connected stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-connected 
stocks, and test the null hypothesis that the difference in returns between the 
connected and the non-connected portfolio on news (no-news) is equal to zero. 
                                                 
17 See Daniel et al (1997) for evidence that the universe of mutual fund managers lacks timing 
ability in general. 
18 This decomposition is similar to that in Baker et al. (2005). Focusing on trades (rather than level 
holdings) prior to earnings announcements, they find that mutual fund managers do seem to exhibit 
ability in predicting future returns around these earnings announcements. The Small World of Investing — Page 19 
 
Looking at months with no headlines or earnings announcement, we are unable to 
reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the connected and the non- 
connected portfolio. Looking at the return on earnings announcements or other 
headlines news reveals that the difference in average returns between a portfolio of 
connected holdings and one of non-connected holdings is entirely concentrated in 
news months: for all four types of connections, the premium of connected holdings 
over non-connected is large and significant (ranging from 1.36% to 4.58% annually) 
in months with corporate news announcements and it is not statistically different 
from zero in months with no headline news.  
Panel B also reports similar results for news returns adjusted using a matched 
sample. Since the release of information moves security prices, it is possible to 
expect most of the difference in returns between any two portfolios to be 
concentrated around news release. Thus, the results in panel B may simply reflect 
the fact that most price movements occur around public announcements. We 
address this issue using a random control sample. At the beginning of every 
calendar quarter we sample a random portfolio of 500 stocks from the universe of 
mutual fund holdings, and compute monthly returns on news and no news. We 
rebalance the portfolio quarterly to maintain value weights. We bootstrap with 
replacement 100,000 of such random portfolios. Finally we compute simulation-
adjusted returns as raw returns minus the average return of random portfolios in 
the same average return quintile. We then report average (adjusted) return of the 
long-short portfolio that holds the portfolio of connected stocks and sells short the 
portfolio of non-connected stocks. Hence we are testing the null hypothesis that the 
difference in returns between the connected and the non-connected portfolio on 
news (no-news) is equal to the difference in returns between two random portfolios 
with the same average return. Results are shown in Panel B. Although adjusting 
for the average return in news and no news month does reduce the magnitude of 
the difference in returns, the premium of connected holdings is large and entirely 
concentrated around news releases. In other words, portfolios of stocks that are 
located in a fund’s education network display a disproportionate amount of (net) 
positive news (defined as high returns in news months) with respect to a portfolio The Small World of Investing — Page 20 
 
of firms outside the fund’s network or a random portfolio with the same average 
return. Taken together, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that social 
networks facilitate the flow of private information. The difference in performance 
between connected and non-connected stocks is disproportionably concentrated at 
times when information is being released to the investing public in the form of 
public announcements. In other words, the transfer of information surrounding 
news releases seems to be a key determinant of the out-performance of connected 
holdings that we document in the paper.  
 
VI.  Robustness Tests 
In Table IX we report a series of robustness checks. The table is split into 
three panels: Panel A contains tests on sub-periods and firm characteristics, Panel 
B contains tests on fund characteristics, and Panel C contains tests on academic 
institutions. Panel A indicates that the difference in returns between a portfolio of 
connected stocks and one of non-connected stocks (hereafter “connection 
premium”) is stronger in small cap stocks (up to 15.72% annually), although it is 
still large and reliable for large stocks (up to 8.47% annually). Thus, it does not 
seem that small information-opaque firms are driving the results. The connection 
premium is roughly the same over sub-periods of the sample: 1990-1998 and 1999-
2006. Also, RegFD was passed partway through our sample. Thus, to the extent 
that the type of information transfer occurring through the networks was covered 
by RegFD, there may be a difference before and after RegFD was put into effect. 
Interestingly, the premium is almost identical in the pre- and post-RegFD periods 
(post-2000Q4), earning up to 9.59% annually for CONNECTED4 connections 
compared to 9.75% annually in the pre-RegFD period. This implies that new laws 
designed to reduce selective disclosure of information have had no effect on the 
connection premium we document here. So either the type of information conveyed 
through these networks is not sensitive to RegFD, or the agents do not perceive a 
sufficiently large risk of being detected (even if the information transfer is subject 
to this rule). Last, we control for the effect of geographical proximity on fund 
returns documented by Coval and Moskowitz (2001). One alternative hypothesis is The Small World of Investing — Page 21 
 
that individuals tend to be employed close to their last academic institution (e.g. 
Yale graduates tend to operate in firms or funds based in CT), thus generating 
overlap between academic networks and geographical proximity. To control for 
proximity, we extract the headquarter location for firms and mutual funds in our 
sample from their SEC filings on the EDGAR system
19. We compute “local” 
(“distant”) holdings on connected and non-connected stocks, defined as firms 
located within (beyond) 100Km from the fund. Table IX shows that the connection 
premium is equivalent for both local and distant holdings, suggesting that 
geographical proximity is unlikely to be driving our results.  
Panel B of Table IX shows that the connection premium is also not driven by 
a given fund investment style. It is robust across various fund manager investment 
objective codes (ex. Growth compared to Growth and Income), although it is 
somewhat stronger among large cap funds, particularly for strong connections 
(CONNECTED4). Interestingly, multi-manager funds earn a higher connection 
premium than single-manager funds, particularly for strong connections (up to 
12.56% annually for CONNECTED4, compared to 6.71% for single-manager 
funds). This could possibly be due to the increased number of education networks 
these funds have through which to receive information. 
Panel C reports tests controlling for different characteristics of the academic 
institutions. Our results do not appear to be driven by a few top schools; as we 
split the sample into Ivy League and non-Ivy League schools, the connection 
premium is roughly equivalent (if anything, it is smaller for Ivy League schools for 
the highest degrees of connection).  Another possibility is that only schools with 
very large education networks (many firms and portfolio managers) are able to 
realize returns to the education social network. To test this, we split the sample 
into the five most connected schools (from Table II), and the rest of the sample. 
The connection premium is almost identical between the two sub-samples, 
suggesting that our results are not driven solely by the most connected schools. 
                                                 
19 We use all the 10-K forms (firms) and NSAR forms (mutual funds) on the Edgar system from 
1993 to 2006. We match zip codes to their corresponding latitude and longitude and compute the 
distance between each fund and its holdings using the following 
approximation: 22 distance =  [69.1(latitude1-latitude )] + [53(longitude1-longitude2)]   . The Small World of Investing — Page 22 
 
Lastly, we test the hypothesis of a common school effect using a different measure 
than Table VI. We create “school-adjusted returns” for each stock, which is the 
stock’s return minus a value-weighted portfolio of all stocks that have senior 
officers that received at least one degree from the same institution as a senior 
officer from the given firm. Similar to the connected not-held results in Table VII, 
the school-adjusted return results indicate that even after this adjustment, 
portfolio managers’ choices of connected firms significantly outperform those 
connected firms the portfolio manager chooses not to hold. 
 
VII.  Manager Changes 
This section examines changes in a fund’s portfolio manager. We use 
manager replacements as a convenient lab to study how changes in the available 
network influence a fund’s portfolio allocation. If the effect we find in Sections IV-
VI is indeed driven by school connections, we expect to see incoming managers 
replacing stocks in the previous manager’s network with securities within his own 
network. We follow a standard event-study methodology. In order to obtain a 
clean measure of changes in the available network, we restrict the analysis to funds 
managed by a single portfolio manager (not a team) and to manager changes 
where the new portfolio manager and the prior portfolio manager did not receive a 
degree from the same academic institution (e.g. a Yale manager replaced by a 
Stanford manager). 
Figure 3 shows changes in portfolio allocation. We measure the changes in 
holdings in event time from the date of the manager change. Period -1 represents 
the last portfolio snapshot of the old manager and Period +1 represents the first 
portfolio snapshot of the new manager. Weight is defined as the percentage holding 
of a stock averaged over the last 2 quarters (for event quarter <0) or over the next 
2 quarters (for event quarter >0).
20 The red line in the figure shows the fund’s 
portfolio weights of stocks connected to the old manager (which are by definition 
not connected to the new manager). The blue line shows the weights in stocks 
connected to the new manager (again by definition not connected to the old 
                                                 
20 We average across consecutive quarters since funds’ holdings are either quarterly or semi-annual.  The Small World of Investing — Page 23 
 
manager). Consistent with school connections having an impact on managers’ 
portfolio choices, the incoming manager significantly decreases exposure to firms 
connected to the previous manager, while at the same time significantly increasing 
exposure to firms in her network. Both the new manager’s drop in portfolio weight 
in stocks connected to the old manager (-24.73 basis points, t-statistics =-3.17), 
and the increase in weight in stocks in her network (59.95 basis points, t-
statistics=5.25) are economically large, given the average weight in our sample of 
89 basis points. 
Table X presents a more formal analysis using a regression approach. An 
alternative explanation of the findings in figure 3 is that a new manager 
unconditionally unwinds all positions of the old manager (and replaces them with 
new ones). A regression approach allows us to control for this effect as well as 
other determinants of portfolio choices at the stock and fund level. We regress 
changes in portfolio weights on a series of dummy variables and control variables. 
The dependent variable is the average fund portfolio weight in the stock in the 
year following manager change, minus the average fund holding in the year before 
manager change. The independent variables include a series of dummies and 
controls. New Manager’s Stock (New Manager’s Connected Stock) is a categorical 
variable equal to 1 for any (connected) stock held in the new manager’s portfolio. 
Old Manager’s Stock and Old Manager’s Connected Stock are defined equivalently. 
By definition New Manager’s Connected Stock and Old Manager’s Connected 
Stock are mutually exclusive sets, while New Manager’s Stock and Old Manager’s 
Stock can both be equal to 1 since the new manager and old manager can both 
hold the same stock.  
The results in Table X indicate that on average, new managers tend to 
unwind previous managers’ positions and replace them with fresh ones (coefficients 
on New Manager’s Stock and Old Manager’s Stock), but controlling for this effect, 
managers show a tendency to immediately place significant larger bets in stocks 
within their network.
21 Looking at column 1, the coefficient on New Manager’s 
                                                 
21 Jin and Scherbina (2006) find evidence that new managers sell inherited momentum losers.  
Running these regressions interacting all categorical variables with past returns, and with 
categorical variables for negative past returns, did not change the magnitude or significance of the The Small World of Investing — Page 24 
 
Connected Stock implies that the new manager nearly doubles the weight in stocks 
within his network (from 55 to 101 basis points), a large and statistically 
significant effect. Looking at sales of stocks previously owned by the old manager, 
although the decrease in weights is larger for previously-connected stocks, we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in behavior between connected 
and non-connected securities. Taken together, these results suggest that new 
managers unwind previous managers’ positions unconditionally, and immediately 
place larger bets in stocks within her networks relative to all newly chosen 
positions.    
 
VIII.  Fund manager behavior 
In this section we further examine the trading behavior of the fund managers 
in our sample. As demonstrated in Section IV, fund managers tend to place larger 
concentrated bets on companies to which they are connected through their 
education network. Specifically, among the stocks they choose to hold, managers 
place a greater weight on connected stocks relative to non-connected stocks. A 
separate but related question is the extent to which fund managers unconditionally 
overweight all connected stocks. Panel A reports the average fraction of fund 
holdings invested in connected securities, the average fraction of connected 
securities in the market portfolio, and the difference between them. Panel A shows 
that fund managers tend to underweight connected stocks relative to their weights 
in the market portfolio, for all four connection definitions. This result suggests that 
managers do not simply overweight all connected stocks, as a familiarity 
explanation might suggest, but instead actively decide which connected stocks to 
hold and which not to hold. And for those connected stocks that they do choose to 
hold, they place large bets on them and earn large abnormal returns on them, 
consistent with comparative advantages in the collection of information through a 
network.  
Given the large abnormal returns to investing in connected stocks that we 
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document in this paper, a natural follow-up question is: why don’t fund managers 
invest even more of their portfolio in connected stocks?  To explore this question 
we conduct two tests. The first test is to compute the average Sharpe ratios of 
individual mutual funds’ connected holdings and overall holdings (unlike the 
Sharpe ratios shown in Table 4, which are computed at the aggregate mutual fund 
portfolio level). As shown in Panel B, the average Sharpe ratio at the individual 
fund level on CONNECTED1 stocks is significantly lower than the average Sharpe 
ratio at the fund level for all holdings (.37 compared to .52); we obtain similar 
results for the other three connection definitions. This result suggests that for a 
given mutual fund, it may not be optimal to invest more in connected stocks given 
the fact that this would yield a more undiversified portfolio.  
To address this question formally, we conduct a second test to identify the 
managers for whom it would have been optimal to invest more in connected stocks 
during our sample period. Specifically, for each fund manager, we run a time-series 
regression of the fund’s monthly return in connected securities on the fund’s total 
return. A significant alpha in this regression indicates that a fund manager could 
have chosen some linear combination of the left- and right-hand side portfolios in 
order to have increased his in-sample Sharpe ratio. We compute the percentage of 
funds for which we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the alpha is equal to 
zero, i.e., the percentage of funds that chose a sub-optimal weight in connected 
stocks in-sample. Column 3 of Panel B shows that this number ranges from 1.9% 
of funds (for CONNECTED4 stocks) to 5.4% of funds (for CONNECTED1 stocks), 
indicating that very few funds would have been made better off by investing more 
than what they already did in connected stocks during our sample period. 
We also investigate the extent to which fund managers who are connected to 
each other through shared educational backgrounds tend to herd in their trading 
decisions, particularly on connected stocks. We explore this issue by identifying, for 
a given portfolio manager j, all fund managers that attended the same academic 
institution as manager j ; we then sum up the dollar holdings of this connected 
manager portfolio (excluding manager j’s holdings). To test connected manager 
herding, we regress the change in the percentage holding of a stock (dw) by a given The Small World of Investing — Page 26 
 
fund manager j  in a given quarter on the change in the connected manager 
portfolio (DWMC) for that stock in that quarter. We also interact this connected 
manager portfolio with a dummy variable (Z1) equal to one if the stock in question 
is a connected stock, to test if fund managers herd with managers to whom they 
are connected and specifically on connected stocks. Panel C in Table XI shows that 
fund managers’ trades are significantly positively related to the trades of managers 
to whom they are connected (i.e., connected managers herd with each other), even 
controlling for the overall tendency of managers to herd with each other (captured 
by  DWALL, the change in the overall mutual fund portfolio for a given stock). 
Further, the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term (DWMC*Z1) 
indicates that connected managers herd more with each other especially on 
connected stocks.  
IX.  Conclusions  
This paper suggests that social networks are important for information flow 
between firms and investors. Specifically, we provide evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that the social network formed through education links allows portfolio 
managers to gather information on firms. We find that portfolio managers place 
larger concentrated bets on stocks they are connected to through their education 
network, and do significantly better on these holdings relative to non-connected 
holdings, and relative to connected firms they choose not to hold. A portfolio of 
connected stocks held by managers outperforms non-connected stocks by up to 
8.4% per year. This connection premium is not driven by firm, fund, school, 
industry, or geographic location effects, and is not driven by a subset of the school 
connections (ex. Ivy League). Further, we find that the bulk of this premium 
occurs around corporate news events such as earnings announcements, lending 
support to the hypothesis that the excess return earned on connected stocks is 
driven by information flowing through the network.  
We believe social networks provide a natural framework to test the flow of 
private information into security prices. Information can be followed in a 
predictable path along the network. Further, as the information will eventually be 
revealed into stock prices, advance knowledge implies return predictability. In this The Small World of Investing — Page 27 
 
paper we exploit education networks between portfolio managers and firm senior 
officers. The advantage of these educations networks is that they are formed on 
average decades before the private information being transferred, and are most 
often independent of the information being transferred. What we document using 
these networks is not an isolated situation or constrained to a few portfolio 
managers or firms, but rather a systematic effect across the entire universe of U.S. 
firms and portfolio managers. We believe the avenue of future research in social 
networks should examine both various forms of social networks and to what extent 
different types of information are delivered across different networks. 
Understanding these issues could give a better idea of how information flows, and 
how investors receive information, in security markets and so allow us to better 
predict how and when prices will respond to new information. The Small World of Investing — Page 28 
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Table I: Summary statistics: mutual funds 
 
This table shows summary statistics as of December of each year for the sample of mutual funds and their 
common stock holdings between 1990 and 2006. We include in the sample of funds/portfolio managers 
actively-managed, domestic equity mutual funds from the merged CDA/Spectrum - Morningstar data with 
a self-declared investment objective of aggressive growth, growth, or growth-and-income and non missing 
information on the portfolio manager’s identity and educational background. The sample of stocks includes 
the funds’ holdings in common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 or 11) from the merged CRSP/BOARDEX 
data with non missing information on the educational background of members of the board of directors 
and senior officers of the firm (CEO, CFO or Chairman). “Fund turnover in portfolio managers” is the 
fraction of funds with at least one complete manager(s) replacement during the calendar year.  
 
 
Panel A: Time series (annual observations, 1990—2006)  mean median min  max  Stdev
Number of funds per year  709 747 331 924  168
Number of portfolio managers per year  821 825 397 1,174  197
% of active equity fund universe (% of funds)  0.75 0.74 0.67 0.86  0.06
% of active equity fund universe (% of total assets)  0.84 0.85 0.74 0.94  0.05
Fund turnover in portfolio managers (% of funds)  0.14 0.14 0.06 0.32  0.06
Fund turnover in portfolio managers (% of total assets)  0.14 0.13 0.05 0.33  0.08
Number of firms per year  4,543 4,462 3,281 5,881  864
Number of board members per year  25,027 25,540 12,569 35,754  8,285
Number of firm’s senior officers per year  7,207 7,798 3,446 9,698  2,296
% of CRSP common stock universe (% of stocks)  0.76 0.78 0.59 0.89  0.10
% of CRSP common stock universe (% of total market value)  0.96 0.97 0.91 0.99  0.03
Number of academic institutions per year  354 359 218 406  49
Panel B: Pooled firm-year or fund-year observation  mean median min  max  Stdev
    
Number of academic institutions per firm  9.8 7.0 1.0 139.0  9.4
Number of board members per academic institution  64.9 20.0 1.0 3954.0  173.1
Number of firm’s senior officers per academic institution  21.7 7.0 1.0 1159.0  54.9
Number of academic institutions per fund  2.9 2.0 1.0 25.0  2.5
Number of portfolio managers per academic institution  6.0 2.0 1.0 130.0  11.2
Number of board members per firm  4.1 3.0 1.0 26.0  3.1
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Table II: Summary statistics: academic institutions 
 
This table shows summary statistics of the sample of academic institutions between 1990 and 2006. We include 
in the sample of funds/managers all actively-managed, domestic equity mutual funds from the merged 
CDA/Spectrum-Morningstar database with a self-declared investment objective of aggressive growth, growth, or 
growth-and-income and non missing information on the portfolio manager’s identity and the manager’s   
educational background. The sample of stocks includes the funds’ holdings in common stocks (CRSP share codes 
10 or 11) from the merged CRSP/BOARDEX data with non missing information on the educational background 
of members of the board of directors and senior officers of the firm (defined as CEO, CFO or Chairman). Panel 
A shows the top 5 most connected academic institutions, ranked by the average number of connected firms 
(portfolio managers) over the period 1990 to 2006. In this table an institution is defined as connected to a firm 
(fund) if a senior officer (portfolio manager) holds any degree from that that institution. Panel B shows the 
distribution of degrees and graduation years over the entire sample.  
 
 
Panel A: top 5 most connected academic institutions, 1990 — 2006 (all degrees) 
  Firm’s senior officers  Portfolio managers 
  Academic institution  Average # 
of firms 
Average % of 
CRSP firms 




1  Harvard University  1,014  0.12  Harvard University  147  0.16 
2  Stanford University  384  0.05  University of Pennsylvania  98  0.11 
3  University of Pennsylvania  325  0.04  Columbia University   90  0.09 
4  Columbia University  257  0.03  University of Chicago  92  0.09 
5  University of Chicago  201  0.02  New York University  85  0.08 
Panel B: distribution of degree and graduation years 








Business school  0.37  0.58  ≤  1950  0.01 0.02 
Medical school  0.01  0.00  1950 — 1959  0.12  0.05 
Graduate (nondescript)  0.18  0.14  1960 — 1969  0.34  0.25 
PH.D.  0.06  0.03  1970 — 1979  0.33  0.31 
Law School  0.07  0.02  1980 — 1989  0.17  0.32 
Undergraduate 0.86  0.91  ≥  1990  0.02 0.06 
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Table III: OLS regression, portfolio weights in connected vs. non-connected stocks 
This table reports pooled OLS quarterly regressions of mutual funds’ portfolio weights in connected and non-connected stocks. The sample 
period is 1990-2006 and the units of observation are fund-stock-quarter. The dependent variable in the regressions is the fund’s dollar investment 
in a stock as a percentage of total net assets of the fund (w ). The independent variables of interest are those measuring the connection of the 
portfolio manager to the given firm. In Panel A, these are categorical variables for whether a senior officer (CEO, CFO, or Chairman) of the 
given firm and the given mutual fund manager attended the (i) same school CONNECTED1, (ii) the same school and received the same degree 
CONNECTED2, (iii) the same school and overlapped in years CONNECTED3, and (iv) the same school, received the same degree, and 
overlapped in years CONNECTED4. The control variables included where indicated are: %STYLE, the percentage of the fund’s total net assets 
invested in the style corresponding to the stock being considered (style is calculated as in DGTW (1997)), ME, BM and R12 which are 
percentiles of market value of equity, book to market, and past 12 month return. Panel B differs from Panel A in that the connections are 
orthogonalized to one another. So, CONNECTED1 measures the case where the portfolio manager and senior officer attended the same school, 
but did not receive the same degree nor overlap in years. CONNECTED2 in Panel B measures cases of the same school and same degree, but no 
overlap in years, while CONNECTED3 measures cases of the same school and year overlap, but not the same degrees. Quarter fixed effects are 
included in each regression, and industry (Fama-French 48), firm, fund’s investment objective code (IOC), and fund fixed effects are included 
where indicated. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the quarter level and are reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. 5% 
statistical significance is indicated in bold.  
 
 
Panel A: OLS regression 
Basic connection measure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Constant  89.4 90.0 90.4 90.5 89.4 -57.2  -57.9  -32.9  -66.4  -27.4 
  [0.05] [0.03] [0.01] [0.00] [0.05] [2.85] [2.40] [4.34] [2.46] [2.91] 
CONNECTED1  28.45      28.02  10.01  9.76  2.79  10.37  9.02 
Same School  [1.30]        [1.23] [0.58] [0.55] [0.66] [0.58] [0.39] 
CONNECTED2   27.03          
Same School, same degree    [ 1 . 5 9 ]           
CONNECTED3     41.42         
Same School, year overlap     [ 3 . 4 3 ]          
CONNECTED4      40.00 13.14 10.16 10.61  8.37  10.51 11.97 
Same School, same degree, year overlap        [4.55] [3.82] [3.35] [3.37] [3.23] [3.29] [2.32] 
Controls  No No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed  effect  Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 
Fixed  effect         Industry Firm  IOC  Fund 
R2  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.49 The Small World of Investing — Page 35 
 





Panel B: OLS regression 
orthogonal connection measure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant  90.0 90.0 90.5 89.4 -57.2  -57.9  -32.8  -66.4  -27.5 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.00] [0.04] [2.85] [2.40] [4.34] [2.46] [2.91] 
CONNECTED1  27.6      28.2 11.74  11.09 3.58 12.23 7.92 
Same School only  [1.32]      [1.32] [0.65] [0.65] [0.80] [0.65] [0.55] 
CONNECTED2   26.0    26.1 7.20 7.26 1.01 7.37 9.55 
Same School, same degree, no overlap    [1.45]    [1.43] [0.90] [0.86] [0.79] [0.91] [0.60] 
CONNECTED3     42.6 38.6 20.1 20.9 12.8  20.96  9.04 
Same School, year overlap, not same degree     [3.13] [3.03] [2.66] [2.62] [2.38] [2.58] [1.92] 
Controls  No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed effect  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 
Fixed  effect        Industry  Firm  IOC  Fund 
R2  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.49 The Small World of Investing — Page 36 
 
Table IV: Returns on connected holdings, 1990 — 2006 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio excess returns.  At the beginning of every calendar quarter 
stocks in each mutual fund portfolio (based on the most recent SEC filing) are assigned to one of 
two portfolios (connected and non-connected). In this table, connected companies are defined as 
firms where at least a senior official (CEO, CFO or Chairman) received the same degree from the 
same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, and overlapped with the portfolio manager during 
the pursuit of the degree. We compute monthly returns on connected and non-connected holdings 
between reports based on the assumption that funds did not change their holding between reports. 
Portfolios are rebalanced every calendar quarter and within a given fund portfolio, stocks are 
weighted by the fund’s dollar holdings. Finally, we compute value weighted calendar time portfolios 
by averaging across funds, weighting individual fund portfolios by the fund’s total net asset value at 
the end of the previous quarter. This table includes all available stocks and all available funds. We 
report average portfolio returns minus Treasury bill returns in the period 1990 to 2006. Returns are 
in annual percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.  L/S is the annual average 
return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of connected stocks and sells short the 
portfolio of non-connected stocks. t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% 






All holdings  Connected 
holdings 
Non-connected L/S 
Mean 7.81  16.05  7.69  8.36 
t-statistic  (1.73) (3.28) (1.71) (3.78) 
      
Std deviation   18.59   20.17   18.54   9.12 
Skewness  -0.96 -1.54 -0.96 -0.42 
Kurtosis  -0.30 0.31 -0.32 -0.19 
Sharpe  ratio  0.42 0.80 0.41 0.92 
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Table V:  Connected holdings, abnormal returns 1990 — 2006  
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar quarter stocks in each mutual fund portfolio (based on the most recent SEC filing) 
are assigned to one of two portfolios (connected and non-connected). In this table, connected companies are defined as firms where at least a senior official (CEO, CFO or 
Chairman) received any degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager (CONNECTED1), received the same degree from the same institution as the 
fund’s portfolio manager (CONNECTED2), received any degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager and overlapped with the portfolio manager 
during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED3) or received the same degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, and overlapped with the 
portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED4). In columns 8-10 the connections are orthogonalized to one another. So, CONNECTED1 measures 
the case where the portfolio manager and senior officer attended the same school, but did not receive the same degree nor overlap in years. CONNECTED2 measures 
cases of the same school and same degree, but no overlap in years, while CONNECTED3 measures cases of the same school and year overlap, but not the same degrees. 
We compute monthly returns on connected and non-connected holdings between reports based on the assumption that funds did not change their holding between 
reports. Portfolios are rebalanced every calendar quarter and within a given fund portfolio, stocks are value weighted by the fund’s dollar holdings. Finally, we compute 
value weighted calendar time portfolios by averaging across funds, weighting individual fund portfolios by the fund’s total net asset value at the end of the previous 
quarter. This table includes all available stocks and all available funds. We report average returns, DGTW-adjusted returns and 5-factor alphas in the period 1990 to 
2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, market-book, 
and one year momentum quintile. Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly portfolio excess returns. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from 
Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, Carhart (1997) momentum factor and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Returns and alphas are in annual 
percent. L/S is annual average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of connected stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-connected stocks. t-statistics 
are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
 








  (2.62)  (0.89)  (0.14)        
Not connected   11.73   0.37  -0.04        







L/S L/S L/S 
CONNECTED1  14.76  3.03 2.06 1.69 2.92 2.96 2.50 1.55 2.35 
Same School  (3.00) (2.74) (2.63) (2.62) (3.16) (3.40) (2.29) (2.17) (2.33) 
CONNECTED2  15.44  3.71 2.29 1.91 3.25 3.28 3.46 1.81 3.04 
Same School, same degree  (3.13) (3.25) (2.52) (2.58) (3.17) (3.21) (3.06) (2.39) (2.99) 
CONNECTED3  18.58  6.85 4.78 4.41 6.50 6.54 5.03 4.06 5.05 
Same School, year overlap  (3.66) (4.62) (3.63) (4.25) (3.76) (3.80) (1.52) (0.52) (1.82) 
CONNECTED4  20.08  8.36 5.83 5.46 8.70 8.74       
Same School, same degree, year overlap  (4.02) (3.78) (3.24) (3.30) (3.80) (3.80)       
 





Table VI: Connected holdings not held, abnormal returns 1990 — 2006  
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar quarter stocks in each mutual fund portfolio (based on the most recent SEC 
filing) are assigned to one of two portfolios (connected and non-connected). In this table, connected companies are defined as firms where at least a senior official 
(CEO, CFO or Chairman) received any degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager (CONNECTED1), received the same degree from the 
same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager (CONNECTED2), received any degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager and overlapped 
with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED3) or received the same degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio 
manager, and overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED4). We compute monthly returns on connected and non-
connected holdings between reports based on the assumption that funds did not change their holding between reports. Portfolios are rebalanced every calendar 
quarter and within a given fund portfolio, stocks are value weighted by the fund’s dollar holdings. Finally, we compute value weighted calendar time portfolios by 
averaging across funds, weighting individual fund portfolios by the fund’s total net asset value at the end of the previous quarter. Similarly, we compute value 
weighted portfolios of connected stocks not held by the mutual fund managers. This table includes all available stocks and all available funds. Column 2 reports 
the average number of connected CRSP stocks (“all CRSP connected”), columns 3 and 4 report the equally weighted (EW) or value weighted (VW) fraction of  
connected stocks held by the aggregate mutual fund sector. In columns 5 -10 we report average returns, and DGTW-adjusted returns. DGTW characteristic-
adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, market-book, and one year 
momentum quintile. Returns and alphas are in annual percent. L/S is annual average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of connected stocks 
held by the funds and sells short the portfolio of connected stocks not held by the funds. t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical 
significance is indicated in bold. 
 
 
 Connected  universe  Return  DGTW-adjusted  return 















CONNECTED1 2,381  0.35  0.80  13.06 14.76  1.70 0.71 2.06 1.35 
Same School       (2.94) (3.00) (1.46) (1.67) (2.63) (2.15) 
CONNECTED2 2,258  0.23  0.65  13.16 15.44  2.28  0.77  2.29 1.51 
Same School, same degree       (2.95) (3.13) (2.13) (1.75) (2.52) (2.22) 
CONNECTED3 1,592  0.09  0.42  13.50 18.58  5.08  0.45  4.78 4.33 
Same School, year overlap       (2.96) (3.66) (3.76) (1.10) (3.63) (3.51) 
CONNECTED4 1,308  0.06  0.31  13.76 20.08  6.32  0.78  5.83 5.05 
Same School, same degree, year overlap       (2.96) (4.02) (3.50) (0.34) (3.24) (2.89) 
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Table VII: Connected holdings, purchases and sells, abnormal returns 1990 — 2006  
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio excess returns.  At the beginning of every calendar quarter stocks purchased within each mutual fund portfolio (based on a 
comparison of the most recent SEC filing with the prior filing) are assigned to one of two portfolios (connected and non-connected).  In this table, “purchases” are 
defined as first-time purchases of a stock (“pickups”) plus all instances where a fund increases its portfolio weight in a given stock relative to its prior position; “sells” 
are defined as all instances where a fund decreases its portfolio weight in a given stock relative to its prior position, or sells off its entire remaining position in a stock.  
Connected companies are defined as firms where at least a senior official (CEO, CFO or Chairman) received any degree from the same institution as the fund’s 
portfolio manager (CONNECTED1), received the same degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager (CONNECTED2), received any degree from 
the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager and overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED3) or received the 
same degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, and overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED4). 
We compute monthly returns on connected and non-connected holdings between reports based on the assumption that funds did not change their holding between 
reports. Portfolios are rebalanced every calendar quarter and within a given fund portfolio, stocks are value weighted by the fund’s dollar holdings. Finally, we 
compute value weighted calendar time portfolios by averaging across funds. Value weighted portfolios are computed by weighting individual fund value weighted 
portfolios by the fund’s total net asset value at the end of the previous quarter. This table includes all available stocks and all available funds. We report average 
returns, DGTW-adjusted returns and 5-factor alphas in the period 1990 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns 
on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, market-book, and one year momentum quintile. Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly 
portfolio excess returns. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, Carhart (1997) momentum factor and 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Returns and alphas are in annual percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.  In Panel A, “L/S” is 
the annual average return of a zero cost portfolio that buys a portfolio of connected purchases and sells short a portfolio of non-connected purchases; “L/S (Pickups)” 
restricts the definition of purchases to only first-time purchases (“pickups) of a stock, and equals the annual average return of a zero cost portfolio that buys a 
portfolio of connected pickups and sells short a portfolio of non-connected pickups.  In Panel B, “L/S” is the annual average return of a zero cost portfolio that buys a 
portfolio of non-connected sells and sells short a portfolio of connected sells; “L/S (PminS)” is the annual average return of a zero cost portfolio that buys a portfolio 
of connected purchases and sells short a portfolio of connected sells.  t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated 
in bold. 
Panel A: Purchases  Raw returns  DGTW-adjusted returns  5-factor alpha 
All purchases  12.06   0.31  -0.58  
  (2.56)  (0.41)  (1.12)  
Not connected purchases   11.97   0.27  -0.67  













CONNECTED1  14.66 2.69 6.49  1.52 1.24 4.41  1.29  1.96 5.03 
Same School  (2.85) (2.27) (4.12) (1.69) (1.62) (3.50) (1.70) (2.91) (4.29) 
CONNECTED2  15.58  3.62 5.91 2.30 2.03 4.98 1.82 2.49 5.73 
Same School, same degree  (3.15) (3.08) (3.35) (2.25) (2.54) (5.48) (2.01) (2.94) (3.90) 
CONNECTED3  19.64 7.68 2.80  5.88 5.61 1.95  4.96 5.63 3.56 
Same School, year overlap  (3.59) (5.32) (0.55) (3.77) (5.39) (0.48) (3.16) (3.72) (1.08) 
CONNECTED4  21.01 9.04 4.01  6.78 6.50 2.26  6.34 7.01 7.49 





















Panel B: Sells  Raw returns  DGTW-adjusted returns  5-factor alpha 
All sells  11.28   0.61  1.55   
  (2.62)  (1.61)  (2.52)  
Not connected sells (NCS)  11.10   0.54  1.44   













CONNECTED1  15.17 -4.07 -0.51  2.72 -2.18  -1.20  4.09 -2.66  -2.81 
Same School  (3.32) (3.33)  (0.35)  (3.06) (2.51) (1.37)  (4.32)  (2.89) (3.14) 
CONNECTED2  15.19 -4.09 0.39  2.70  -2.16 -0.40  3.86 -2.42  -2.04 
Same School, same degree  (3.09) (3.04)  (0.24)  (2.59) (1.96) (0.36)  (3.51)  (2.19) (1.94) 
CONNECTED3  15.93 -4.83 3.71 3.07  -2.53  2.81 4.79  -3.35 0.17 
Same School, year overlap  (3.03) (2.06)  (1.54)  (1.75) (1.35) (1.46)  (2.37)  (1.71) (0.07) 
CONNECTED4  15.44  4.35 5.57  3.26 -2.72 3.52  4.68  -3.24 1.66 
Same School, same degree, year overlap  (3.54) (1.61)  (1.43)  (1.29) (1.07) (1.13)  (2.03)  (1.44) (0.60) The Small World of Investing — Page 41 
 
Table VIII: Returns around corporate news announcements 
 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns.  At the beginning of every calendar quarter stocks in each mutual fund 
portfolio (based on the most recent SEC filing) are assigned to one of two portfolios (connected and non-connected). For 
each individual stock, we split monthly stock returns into returns on earnings announcements, “earnings announcements” 
defined as returns in calendar months with scheduled quarterly earnings releases, “other headlines” defined as returns in 
calendar months with at least 1 news announcement on the Dow Jones Newswires and no scheduled earnings 
announcements, and “no news returns” defined as returns in calendar months with neither news announcements on the 
Dow Jones newswires nor scheduled quarterly earnings releases. We compute monthly returns on connected and non-
connected holdings between reports based on the assumption that funds do not change their holdings between reports. 
Portfolios are rebalanced every calendar quarter and within a given fund portfolio, stocks are value weighted by the fund’s 
dollar holdings. Finally, we compute value weighted calendar time portfolios by averaging across funds, weighting funds’ 
portfolios by the total net asset value at the end of the previous quarter. This table includes all available stocks and all 
available funds. Panel A reports the distribution of the news events in the period 1990 to 2006. In panel B we report 
average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of connected stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-
connected stocks. Columns 3 to 5 test the null hypothesis that the difference in returns between the connected and the 
non-connected portfolio on news (no-news) is equal to zero. Columns 5 to 7 test the null hypothesis that the difference in 
returns between the connected and the non-connected portfolio on news (no-news) is equal to the difference in returns 
between two random portfolios with the same average return. To compute simulation-adjusted return we bootstrap with 
replacement 100,000 random portfolios iterating the following procedure: at the beginning of every calendar quarter we 
sample a random portfolio of 500 CRSP stocks. Stocks are value weighted within a given portfolio and portfolios are 
rebalanced quarterly. Simulation-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the average return of random 
portfolios in the same average return quintile. Returns are in annual percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient 
estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
Panel A: distribution of headlines news   No news  news     
        
Percent of CRSP monthly return, % of firms  0.59  0.41  # of news events   2,681,914
Percent of CRSP monthly return, % of ME   0.55  0.45  Average # of news per year  157,981
 
Panel B:  Connected minus 
non-connected 
L/S Returns  L/S Simulation-adjusted returns 










CONNECTED1 -0.02  1.36 1.70 -0.46 0.39 0.83 
Same School  (-0.03) (2.44) (2.77) (-0.69) (0.66) (1.35) 
CONNECTED2 0.29  1.03  2.39  -0.14 0.05 1.53 
Same School, same degree  (-0.43) (1.89) (3.42) (-0.21) (0.10) (2.19) 
CONNECTED3 -0.18  4.05 2.99 -0.61  3.08 2.13 
Same School, year overlap  (0.27) (3.67) (3.14) (-0.92) (2.79) (2.24) 
CONNECTED4 0.09  3.69 4.58 -0.34  2.72 4.60 
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Table IX: Robustness checks 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. We report the annual average return of a zero cost portfolio that 
holds the portfolio of connected stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-connected stocks. Connected companies are 
defined as firms where at least a senior official (CEO, CFO or Chairman) received any degree from the same 
institution as the fund’s portfolio manager (CONNECTED1), received the same degree from the same institution as 
the fund’s portfolio manager (CONNECTED2), received any degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio 
manager and overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED3) or received 
the same degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, and overlapped with the portfolio manager 
during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED4). Panel A reports results by sub-period and firm characteristics. 
Panel B reports results by fund characteristics. Panel C reports results by institutions. School adjusted returns are 
defined as raw returns minus the value weighted average of a portfolio of all firms where at least a senior official 
(CEO, CFO or Chairman) received a degree from the same institution. “top 5 most connected” are academic 
institutions, ranked by the average number of connected firms (portfolio managers) over the period 1990 to 2006. 
Panel A: sub periods and size  CONNECTED1  CONNECTED2  CONNECTED3  CONNECTED4 
Large cap stocks  3.48 4.20 7.17 8.47 
Above  NYSE  median  (2.85) (3.54) (4.70) (3.76) 
Small cap stocks  6.58 10.65  21.59  15.72 
Below  NYSE  median  (2.16) (2.04) (2.19) (1.89) 
1990 — 1998  5.16 5.37 7.71 8.07 
  (3.48) (3.83) (3.96) (2.35) 
1997 — 2006  4.38 4.91 8.76 9.51 
  (2.86) (3.68) (4.31) (2.80) 
Pre-Reg FD  4.64 5.48 9.22 9.76 
  (3.29) (4.10) (4.86) (3.17) 
Post-Reg FD  4.40 5.33 8.74 9.59 
  (3.36) (4.34) (4.87) (3.40) 
Panel B: fund characteristics      
Aggressive growth funds  3.52 4.24 6.41 7.66 
  (2.07) (3.82) (2.66) (2.02) 
Growth funds  3.08  4.03 5.73 6.91 
  (1.77) (3.38) (3.39) (2.70) 
Growth and income funds  1.74  3.24 5.77 8.69 
  (1.02) (2.27) (2.71) (3.21) 
Large cap funds  3.05 3.72 6.94 8.43 
Above  median    (2.72) (3.24) (4.67) (3.82) 
Small  cap funds  2.95 3.73 2.81  4.59 
Below  median  (2.85) (2.67) (1.40) (2.11) 
Single portfolio manager  3.01 4.02 5.57 6.71 
  (2.37) (3.35) (3.85) (3.29) 
Multiple portfolio manager  3.18 3.03 9.21  12.56 
  (3.31) (2.21) (2.51) (2.18) 
Local holdings  2.77 4.41 7.55  10.03 
<100Km, 1994 — 2006  (2.77)  (3.27)  (4.09)  (4.17) 
Distant local holdings  2.26 3.80 7.21 9.30 
>100Km, 1994 — 2006  (2.19)  (2.76)  (4.14)  (4.23) 
Panel B: institutions       
Only non-ivy league  4.63 4.81 8.13 9.68 
  (2.67) (3.08) (4.08) (3.18) 
Only ivy league  4.12 4.65 2.00 3.77 
  (4.86) (3.30) (0.89) (1.27) 
School-adjusted return  1.25  1.86 4.38 5.65 
  (1.94) (2.41) (4.70) (3.24) 
Top 5 most connected  2.88 3.79 6.42 7.72 
  (2.46) (2.72) (3.89) (3.56) 
Not Top 5 most connected  3.09 3.77 6.88 8.16 
  (2.78) (3.28) (4.62) (3.66) The Small World of Investing — Page 43 
 
 
Table X: Changes in portfolio weights around changes in portfolio managers 
 
This table reports OLS regressions of changes in mutual funds’ portfolio weights around changes in 
educational connections. In this table, connected companies are defined as firms where at least a 
senior official (CEO, CFO or Chairman) received the same degree from the same institution as the 
fund’s portfolio manager, and overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the 
degree. This figure included the universe of mutual funds managed by a single portfolio manager. A 
manager change represents a replacement of the fund’s portfolio manager where the new portfolio 
manager and the prior portfolio manager never received a degree from the same academic 
institution. The dependent variable is the average fund portfolio weight in the stock in the year 
following manager change (time zero), minus the average fund holding in the year before manager 
change. New Manager’s Stock is a categorical variable equal to 1 for any stock held in the new 
manager’s portfolio, while New Manager’s Connected Stock is a categorical variable equal to 1 for 
any stock held that is connected to the new manager. Old Manager’s Stock and Old Manager’s 
Connected Stock are defined equivalently. The control variables included where indicated are: 
%STYLE, the percentage of the fund’s total net assets invested in the style corresponding to the 
stock being considered (style is calculated as in DGTW (1997)), ME, BM and R12 which are 
percentiles of market value of equity, book to market, and past 12 month return. Quarter fixed 
effects are included in each regression, and firm, fund’s investment objective code (IOC), and fund 
fixed effects are included where indicated. Weights are in basis points; standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the quarter level, and t-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficient 
estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
 
OLS regression: Weight Change 
Following Manager Turnover 
1 2 3 4 5 
Constant -7.31  -17.87  -16.28 2.97 -31.02 
  (-1.84) (-3.41) (-1.79) (0.49) (-1.60) 
New Manager’s Stock  55.15 53.30 53.48 53.42 56.10 
  (18.2) (17.1) (18.8) (17.0) (16.0) 
New Manager’s Connected  Stock  45.98 48.48 43.35 48.54 46.31 
  (2.49) (2.34) (2.12) (2.34) (2.18) 
Old Manager’s Stock  -58.03 -65.82 -69.08 -65.79 -71.48 
  (-9.88) (-11.7) (-13.8) (-11.7) (-11.1) 
Old  Manager’s  Connected  Stock  -4.77 -3.11 -7.66 -3.16 -2.57 
  (-0.38) (-0.27) (-0.65) (-0.27) (-0.23) 
Controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect  Quarter  Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 
Fixed effect      Firm  IOC  Fund 
R2  0.19 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.27 
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Table XI: Fund manager behavior 
 
Panel A reports the average fraction of fund holdings invested in connected securities, the average 
fraction of connected securities in the market portfolio and the difference between them. Fama 
MacBeth t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. Panel B reports average Sharpe 
ratios of individual funds. For each fund manager j , we compute Sharpe ratios (SR) in connected 




SR n SR = ∑  
Column 3 of panel B reports the % of funds with in-sample increase in SR. For each fund manager j 
we run a time series regression of the fund’s monthly return in connected securities (CONNRET) on 
the funds total return (RET): 
 
,, , CONNRET RET jt j j jt jt α βε = ++  
Column 3 reports the fraction of funds where the null hypothesis α=0 is rejected at 5% significance. 
Panel C reports pooled, cross-sectional OLS regressions of mutual fund manager trading activity: 
 
1( * 1 ) , 1 _, 2 3 _, 4 ,
ii i i i dw a b DW b Z b DW Z b CONTROLS j t xj CONNECTED t xj CONNECTED t t j t ε =+ + + + +  
 
The dependent variable (
i
t j dw , ) is the change in the percentage holding of a stock by a given 
mutual fund in a given quarter.  For a given portfolio manager j, we identify all fund managers that 
went to the same school as the fund manager j and then sum up all their dollar holdings (excluding 
manager  j’s holdings).  We then compute the change (DWMC) in this connected mutual fund 
portfolio, and include this as an explanatory variable in our regressions.  We also include a dummy 
variable (Z1) equal to 1 if fund manager j is connected to stock i in quarter t, and an interaction 
term (DWMC*Z1) that captures the extent to which fund manager j’s trading behavior is related to 
the trading behavior of the connected mutual fund portfolio for connected stocks in particular.  We 
compute aggregate mutual fund portfolio change (DWALL), equal to the change in the mutual fund 
portfolio of all fund managers. The other explanatory variables are the stock i’s lagged market 
capitalization (ME), stock i’s lagged book-to-market ratio, and stock i’s lagged quarterly return.  
Units are in percentage points; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the quarter level, and 
t-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is 
indicated in bold. 
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  Panel A: Assets connected    Panel B: average Sharpe Ratio of individual funds 
  % held  % market  difference   
SR   Difference  % funds with in-sample 
increase in SR 
All holdings          0.518     
              
CONNECTED1 0.035  0.066  -0.031   0.373  -0.145  0.054 
Same School     (-9.68)     (-4.57)    
CONNECTED2 0.019  0.040  -0.021   0.406  -0.111  0.052 
Same School, same degree     (-9.64)     (-2.28)    
CONNECTED3 0.003  0.008  -0.005   0.391  -0.126  0.029 
Same School, year overlap     (-10.06)     (-4.35)    
CONNECTED4 0.001  0.004  -0.003   0.389  -0.129  0.019 
Same School, same degree, year overlap     (-10.58)     (-2.61)   
Panel C: Herding  Independent Variables 
LHS = dw  DWMC  DWMC*Z1 Z1  DWALL  DWALL*Z1 ln(MEt-1) ln(B/Mt-1) RETt-1 
Model 1   0.674            
  (11.32)          
Model 2  0.628     0.715      
  (10.32)     (3.43)      
Model 3  0.613 0.698  -0.000        
  (9.86)  (3.29)  (0.45)       
Model 4  0.577 0.645  -0.000  0.658  -2.752      
 (9.13)  (3.01)  (0.50)  (3.14)  (-0.39)       
Model 5  0.570 0.648  -0.000  0.661  -2.864 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (8.98)  (3.02)  (0.43)  (3.15)  (-0.40) (0.84) (0.40) (3.33) The Small World of Investing — Page 46 
 
Figure 1: Cummins Engine, 3/1/1996 — 6/30/1998 
 

























Fund purchases 233,200 shares
Fund purchases additional 105,500 shares
Fund liquidates the entire position
- Joint venture with Dongfeng Motor Corp
- Company announces outsourcing contract
- Machinery selected for SAR craft
- Company announces sales record
Simpson Industries Inc. to buy the
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Figure 2: Returns on connected holdings, 1990 — 2006 
 
This figure shows calendar time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar quarter stocks 
in each mutual fund portfolio (based on the most recent SEC filing) are assigned to one of two 
portfolios (connected and non-connected). In this table, connected companies are defined as firms 
where at least a senior official (CEO, CFO or Chairman) received the same degree from the same 
institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, and overlapped with the portfolio manager during the 
pursuit of the degree. We compute monthly returns on connected and non connected holdings 
between reports based on the assumption that funds did not change their holding between reports. 
Portfolios are rebalanced every calendar quarter and within a given fund portfolio, stocks are 
weighted by the fund’s dollar holdings. Finally, we compute value weighted calendar time portfolios 
by averaging across funds, weighting individual fund portfolios by the fund’s total net asset value at 
the end of the previous quarter. This table includes all available stocks and all available funds. We 
report annual returns of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of connected stocks and sells 
short the portfolio of non connected stocks.  
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Figure 3: Connected weights at manager Changes 
 
This figure shows the holdings of mutual funds around changes in educational connections. In this 
figure, connected companies are defined as firms where at least a senior official (CEO, CFO or 
Chairman) received the same degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, and 
overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree. This figure included the 
universe of mutual funds managed by a single portfolio manager. A manager change represents a 
replacement of the fund’s portfolio manager where the new portfolio manager and the prior 
portfolio manager did not receive a degree from the same academic institution. In the figure quarter 
-1 represents the last portfolio snapshot of the old manager and quarter +1 represents the first 
portfolio snapshot of the new manager. Weight is defined as percentage holding of a stock averaged 
over the last 2 quarters (for event quarter <0) or over the next 2 quarters (for event quarter >0). 
“Average weight in stocks connected to the old manager” measures the weights on stocks connected 
to the old manager, but not to the new manager. “Average weight in stocks connected to the new 
manager” measures the weights on stocks connected to the new manager, but not to the old 
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A. Morningstar data 
Since Morningstar only tracks active funds, we use all the historical Morningstar 
OnDisk and Principia CD-ROM at monthly or quarterly intervals (depending 
upon availability) and the Morningstar Mutual Fund Sourcebook between 1990 
and 2003. Unfortunately, due to a change in Morningstar’s data storage process, 
subsequent to 2003, most of the biographical information is no longer available 
on the Principia CD-ROM. We obtain the remaining data directly from 
Morningstar, which provided us with managers’ biographical information on both 
active and inactive funds between 2003 and 2006. When data entries about a 
fund or a portfolio manager are available from multiple source dates, we use data 
from the most recent source date to account for data corrections in subsequent 
releases. Funds on Morningstar are identified by a ticker-date combination.  
 
B.  Matching institutions 
The first problem in matching institutions from BoardEx and Morningstar is the 
situation in which there are multiple names for a given institution in both 
BoardEx and Morningstar. In addition, there are names that could be potentially 
matched to multiple institutions and the individual biography does not make it 
clear which institution the portfolio manager or the firm’s officer attended. We 
match institutions with multiple names by hand. Most specialized school names 
are easy to match back to institution (e.g. Wharton), however if a specialized 
school name could match multiple institutions (e.g. SOM), we drop these 
observations from the sample. In addition, we match all entries given as simply 
state names to the University of State Name. In dealing with multiple campuses, 
we matched each satellite campus as a separate university (e.g. UCLA, UCSD, 
and UC Berkeley are treated as separate universities). If just a university name is 
given for a university system that has satellite campuses (e.g. Penn State for the 
Penn State system of schools), we assume the entry refers to the main campus. 
Whenever a single name is given that could apply to two educational institutions  
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(e.g. Augustana could refer to Augustana College or Augustana University) and 
the individual biography does not make it clear which institution was attended, 
we drop the observations from our sample. Lastly, although we are able to match 
most international universities (outside US), some names refer to multiple 
institutions in multiple countries. We are not able to uniquely match these, and 
thus drop this small number of observations from the sample. Finally, we group 
the degrees into six categories: (i) business school (MBA), (ii) medical school, (iii) 
general graduate (MA or MS), (iv) PhD, (v) law school, and (vi) general 
undergraduate. Most of the data on general graduate degrees or undergraduate 
degrees do not allow us to reliably determine the major course of study, and thus 
we classify them in the two broad categories of (iii) and (vi). 
 
C.  Headline news data 
We extract headline news data from the Dow Jones newswires using the Factiva 
web interface. First, we use the CRSP monthly stock name file to identify all 
company names of CRSP firms between 1990 and 2006. We then select all the 
Dow Jones Newswires available on Factiva (23 total) and for each stock on the 
CRSP tape we extract all the news events where the firm’s name (or any of the 
names if multiple names exist for a given stock) is mentioned in either the 
headline or in the lead paragraph. We restrict the search to news items in 
English containing at least 5 words. We exclude republished news and recurring 
pricing or market data. For every news item we retain the headline, the release 
date, the release time, the word count and the data source. The final sample 
includes 2,685,684 headlines for 14,084 stocks between the year 1990 and 2006. 
Table A1 gives the distribution of news count by data source. 
 
D. Connected Boards 
The use of senior officers to define connected firms has the advantage of being 
simple and intuitive but it is obviously arbitrary. Table A2 reports calendar time 
portfolio returns on connected and non-connected stocks using an alternative 
definition of connected holdings that exploits the identity of the entire board of  
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directors of the firm, not just the top senior officers. We define connected 
companies as firms where at least a 50% of the board of directors received a 
degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager 
(CONNECTED1). We further classify connected firms as CONNECTED2 if at 
least one member of the board of directors received the same degree from the 
same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, CONNECTED3 if at least one 
board member received any degree from the same institution as the fund’s 
portfolio manager but overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit 
of the degree, and CONNECTED4 if at least one board member received the 
same degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, and 
overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree.  Results 
in table A2 confirm that, even under an alternative definition of connected firms, 
mutual fund managers earn high returns on their connected holdings: a 
replicating portfolio of their connected stocks consistently outperforms a 
replicating portfolio of their non-connected holdings.   
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Table A1:  News data, 1990 — 2006 
 
  # of news percent 
Dow Jones News Service        1,040,427  38.7 
Professional Investor Report          352,818  13.1 
Select Federal Filings Newswires          305,409  11.4 
Federal Filings Newswires          230,016  8.6 
Dow Jones News Service - Ticker          204,971  7.6 
Other          552,043  20.6 
All        2,685,684          100.0  
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Table A2: Board connections, abnormal returns 1990 — 2006  
 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns.  At the beginning of every calendar quarter stocks in each mutual fund portfolio (based on the most recent SEC filing) 
are assigned to one of two portfolios (connected and non-connected). In this table, connected companies are defined as firms where at least 50% of the board of directors 
received a degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager (CONNECTED1). We further classify connected firms as CONNECTED2 if at least one 
member of the board of directors received the same degree from the same institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, received any degree from the same institution as the 
fund’s portfolio manager and overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED3) or received the same degree from the same 
institution as the fund’s portfolio manager, and overlapped with the portfolio manager during the pursuit of the degree (CONNECTED4). We compute monthly returns 
on connected and non-connected holdings between reports based on the assumption that funds did not change their holding between reports. Portfolios are rebalanced 
every calendar quarter and within a given fund portfolio, stocks are value weighted by the fund’s dollar holdings. Finally, we compute value weighted calendar time 
portfolios by averaging across funds and by weighting fund portfolios by the fund’s total net asset value at the end of the previous quarter. This table includes all 
available stocks and all available funds. We report average returns, DGTW-adjusted returns and 5-factor alphas in the period 1990 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-
adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, market-book, and one year momentum 
quintile. Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly portfolio excess returns. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) 
mimicking portfolios, Carhart (1997) momentum factor and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. L/S is annual average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds 
the portfolio of connected stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-connected stocks. Returns and alphas are in annual percent, t-statistics are shown below the 
coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
 
Panel A: value weighted returns  Raw return  DGTW-adjusted returns  5-factor alpha 
Not connected   11.23    -0.06    -0.57   
  (2.51)  (-0.13)  (-0.81)  
 Connected 
holdings  L/S 
Connected 
holdings  L/S 
Connected 
holdings  L/S 
CONNECTED1  17.32  6.09 4.26 4.32 6.04 6.61 
> 50% Same School  (3.15) (2.68) (2.78) (2.51) (3.10) (3.35) 
CONNECTED2  17.05  5.83 3.72 3.78 6.44 7.01 
> 50% Same School and at least 1 same degree  (3.03) (2.49) (2.44) (2.24) (3.23) (3.44) 
CONNECTED3  17.49  6.26 3.58 3.64 8.88 9.45 
> 50% Same School and at east 1 year overlap  (3.07) (2.80) (3.17) (3.43) (3.52) (3.84) 
CONNECTED4  19.71 8.48  5.05  5.11 10.82  11.39 
> 50% Same School 
and at least 1 same degree - year overlap 
(3.15) (2.64) (2.57) (2.75) (3.80) (3.98) 
 
 